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Abstract
This article tries to describe the threat of North Korea nuclear to regional and international security. North Korea Nuclear Proliferation is open the
possibility of an arms race, even nuclear war in the region. Moreover, North Korea technology’s ability in produce nuclear weapon will improve the
spread of the weapons, both towards other countries or foreign actors. It needs some regional policy innovation to prevent nuclear proliferation
in the region.
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Abstrak
Artikel ini memberi gambaran tentang ancaman nuklir Korea Utara terhadap keamanan regional maupun internasional. Proliferasi nuklir Korea Utara
membuka kemungkinan bagi hadirnya perlombaan senjata, bahkan perang nuklir, di kawasan. Lebih auh, kemampuan teknologi Korea Utara dalam
memproduksi senjata nuklir akan meningkatkan penyebaran senjata ini, baik terhadap negara lain maupun terhadap aktor di luar negara.
Dibutuhkan sejumlah terobosan kebijakan regional untuk mencegah proliferasi nuklir di kawasan.
Kata Kunci: Nuklir Korea Utara, Ancaman Keamanan, Kebijakan Internasional
INTRODUCTION
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) is an authoritarian state controlled by the
Kim regime for decades. In 2012, the government has
delivered a political message to the world that North
Korea has already attained the status of a politically,
ideologically, and militarily powerful state, while it
seeks to be recognized by the world as a nuclear state
(Nanto and Manyin, 2010: 9). For North Korea,
nuclear armament plays a significant role as a source of
political status as well as strengthening the regime
leadership. In this regard, however, ‘nuclear technol-
ogy, is inherently dual-use: ‘Atoms for Peace’ immedi-
ately suggests the possibility of ‘Atoms for War’ (F.
Lehman II, 1993: 6).
Observations of the state tend to show that the
possibility to use nuclear weapons is high. Nuclear-
armed North Korea has increased vulnerability for
both regional and international security. The possibil-
ity of an arms race or even nuclear war is also consid-
ered. Furthermore, the capability of the DPRK in
nuclear technology is likely to increase the spread of
nuclear weapons to other state and non-state actors.
To deal with these problems, some measures are
possible to realize denuclearization in the Korean
peninsula whether through economic sanctions,
international regime or even military intervention.
Regarding these matters, this article attempts to
discuss why nuclear-armed North Korea poses a threat
to regional and international security. It begins with a
brief explanation of the DPRK nuclear armament
policy. The next section will discuss the threats of the
DPRK nuclear-armed for both regional and interna-
tional security. In addition, discussion of the preferred
option for the international community to deal with a
nuclear-armed North Korea will be addressed in the
final section.
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NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR POLICY
The DPRK is a communist-authoritarian country
led by Kim’s regime. For decades, North Korea was
subject to embargo and isolated by a majority of
countries in the world especially by the United States
and European countries. Generally, the DPRK has a
less significant role in both international economics
and international politics. Nevertheless, the nuclear
proliferation policy issued by the government abso-
lutely increased the significance of the state at the
international level, mainly with regard to security and
peace issues.
In this regard, there are several reasons underlying
the nuclear policy. First, the policy to begin a nuclear
program aims to fulfill national energy needs. This
policy is important for the state budget in order to
support a national program of economic develop-
ment. In spite of this, the energy goal is still debatable,
because of the lack of information regarding the
nuclear program. Second, the nuclear proliferation is
aimed at increasing the political bargaining position
either at regional or international level. Obviously, the
DPRK nuclear proliferation issue has increased the
political leverage of the communist state, at least, in
the region. Some major countries such as United
States, China, Russia and some of European States
have been discussing the issue at international level.
Many solution packages offered to the DPRK govern-
ment consist of economic and political assistance in
order to discontinue the nuclear program.
WHY A NUCLEAR-ARMED NORTH KOREA IS DANGEROUS
Nuclear-armed North Korea is clearly a threat to
both regional and international security. The threats
are related to three critical issues. First, nuclear-armed
North Korea is a threat for regional and international
security because nuclear proliferation is considered to
have occurred in a ‘rogue state’ or ‘untrustworthy
regime’ (Ayson and Taylor, 2004: 269). The Kim
regime is considered to be dangerous because their
authoritarian power makes them likely to use nuclear
weapons. In addition, North Korea frequently shows
provocative action in the region regarding nuclear and
missile forces with tested of nuclear weapons in
October 2006 and May 2009 (Nanto and Manyin,
2010: 4).
Second, North Korea has been labeled as one of the
‘axis of evil’ states, with Iran and Iraq that pose ‘a
grave and growing danger’ to international security
(Howard, 2004: 806). In their article, Proliferation ring;
New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,
Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, argue that
North Korea is a latent proliferation country, which
means this country has capabilities to proliferate
nuclear arms and is likely to export its technology to
other states such as Pakistan and Libya (Braun and
Chyba, 2004: 5-6). In 2002, North Korea appears to
have turned to Pakistan, with its fully developed
uranium enrichment program. ‘This apparently led to
a missile for enrichment technology barter deal
between Pakistan and North Korea, a benchmark event
in the global proliferation enterprise’ (Braun and
Chyba, 2004: 12). Thus, a list of reasons why North
Korea with nuclear capacity is dangerous includes,
most importantly, proliferation through sales and
support to other unreliable states.
In this regard, nuclear proliferation in North Korea
will stimulate a missile and nuclear weapons supply
chain across nations and it means that international
security is threatened with nuclear war. Furthermore,
considering the terrible economic conditions of the
country, North Korea is likely to sell dangerous
weapons to any customers who will pay hard currency,
because they need a sustainable cash flow to finance
their national project (Armacost, Okimoto, and Shin,
2003: 2). Besides that, the spread of nuclear weapons
around the world is increasing the likelihood of
terrorist groups to getting their hands on nuclear
weapons.
In today’s war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear
weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation.
Furthermore, terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are
conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and
present difficult new security challenges (Shultz, Perry,
Kissinger and Nunn, 2007: 1).
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Hence, the efforts to denuclearize North Korea are
critically important to deter the deployment of
nuclear weapons in many other ‘rogue states’ and to
the non-state actors such as militants in Pakistan, Iraq
and many others.
Third, a nuclear-armed North Korea may possibly
turn to facilitating the arms race in the region. Barry
Buzan argues that most attempts to define the arms
race are rooted in the action-reaction model. The basic
proposition of the model is that states strengthen
their armaments because of the threats they perceive
from other states (Buzan, 1978: 76). In this regard,
North Korea’s neighbour states such as Japan, South
Korea, and possibly Taiwan and other Asian countries
are likely to develop their own nuclear deterrence and
ballistic missile capabilities to ensure security from
North Korean threats (Demetriou, 2009: 8). If it
happens, the arms race will obviously exist in the
region.
WHY WAR IS NOT PREFERRED
The most striking policy in dealing with the issue is
the possibility to attack North Korea, particularly led
by the United States and the allies. Regarding this
option, there are four assessments that show the
option to attack North Korea is a very difficult and
risky solution. The first assessment of the policy relates
to the cost of the policy. Some scholars, Robert Ayson
and Brendan Taylor, for instance, argue that the cost
to attack North Korea may be lower than estimated
for the United States (Ayson and Taylor, 2004: 271-
272). The U.S. military superiority over North Korea
will increase the possibility to win the battle and reach
the main target, being to change the Kim regime. In
addition, the absence of a North Korean major power
patron in the military aspect is the key factor that
increases opportunities to change the regime by
military operation. Operations in Iraq and Afghani-
stan are obvious examples that show the lack of a
major power patron makes success more likely, more
quickly and easily than if they enjoy such support
(Ayson and Taylor, 2004: 271-272). Nevertheless,
conditions differ between North Korea and Afghani-
stan as well as Iraq. North Korea has close relations
with one powerful state, China, politically and
economically, although China is not a power patron
of North Korea. This relationship is critical for North
Korea to deal with international pressures regarding
nuclear proliferation.
Secondly, the question to be answered is regarding
the effectiveness of military intervention to shut down
nuclear proliferation and to change the authoritarian
regime. The Kim regime is considered to be the main
problem of the North Korea issue that triggers the
emerging of nuclear forces. It implies that the solution
to deal with North Korean nuclear proliferation is to
address regime change toward democracy in North
Korea. Yet, there is no guarantee that attacking North
Korea will automatically transform the political
system. North Korea is different from other countries
that have been occupied by the U.S such as Iraq and
Afghanistan. While Iraq and Afghanistan are countries
less controlled by central government as well as the
spread of separatism or terrorism movements in many
parts of the nation, North Korea is an authoritarian
state with strong control from central government and
high leverage from the regime. This means that it is
inappropriate to generalize the effectiveness of U.S.
intervention from previous missions and to expect
that it will occur automatically in North Korea.
Thirdly, the U.S. and its allies will face huge
challenges regarding any attack on North Korea. The
challenges will come from China that will likely reject
an option for military intervention to North Korea.
Several reasons to reject the intervention are involved.
China is North Korea’s closest ally, and the largest
trading partner in provision of food, fuel and indus-
trial machinery (Nanto and Manyin, 2010: 1). In
addition, war will cause destabilization in the Korean
peninsula and it is incompatible with China’s interest.
Although, China’s interest in stability on the Korean
peninsula is linked to U.S. interest in denucleariza-
tion, China’s government is unlikely to choose
military intervention, even as ‘the least-worst option,
delivering a statement that diplomacy is the preferred
solution to every provocation by North Korea’ (Nanto
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and Manyin, 2010: 4). Recently, as the most powerful
Country in Asia, China is concerned to maintain
strong leverage in that region and will not allow any
other major power to change the domination. ‘China
has wide influence over North Korea but elects not to
use it in order to ensure that the North Korean issue
continues to complicate U.S. regional strategy and
undermine the U.S. position in Asia’ (Nanto and
Manyin, 2010: 4).
On the other hand, the challenges to attacking
North Korea are Japan and South Korea. Although,
both states are U.S. allies, they are unlikely to prefer
war because it may increase the vulnerability of their
national security with the use of chemical weapons as
a retaliatory strike from North Korea (Ayson and
Taylor, 2004: 265). Both countries acknowledge that
if the war occurs, the U.S. government will deploy
military bases in both states. Thus, it is automatically
to involve Japan and South Korea in that war. Hence,
without support from Japan and South Korea, as the
closest U.S. allies and North Korea’s neighbours it
will be very difficult to destroy the nuclear facilities
effectively.
The last assessment looks at the consequences of a
military attack on North Korea. Military attack will
have particular impact on the nation and also the
wider parties. Military attack on North Korea has
potential to become a widespread war in the region.
In the war, North Korea is very likely to use Weapons
of mass Destruction (WMD) or even nuclear weapons
in retaliation to the attack. The weapons may be the
most effective force for North Korea because they have
no adequate conventional military forces to deal with
the U.S. military forces. If North Korea used WMD
or nuclear weapons the consequences of the war will
be catastrophic for the region. In addition, even if the
attack is to destroy the North Korean nuclear prolif-
eration facilities, the impact will be worse because of
the spread of radioactivity particularly to South Korea,
Japan and parts of China (Carter and Perry, 2002:
275). Hence, the option to attack North Korea is less
urgent and counterproductive for many parties. This
option will be very difficult, if not impossible, because
it is not supported by the three major important
states in the region; China, Japan and South Korea.
INTERNATIONAL REGIME DILEMMAS
Delivering pressure to North Korea through
international regimes such as the U.N. Security
Council or International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to denuclearize North Korea is very difficult.
Basically, the main functions these regimes to control
uranium for energy use only and to ensure the absence
of nuclear weapons in particular states, the IAEA, for
instance, ‘was created to administer safeguards over
peaceful nuclear facilities around the world’ (Nye Jr,
1992: 1294). Yet, the dilemma is that those institu-
tions cannot intervene in a sovereign state. Regarding
nuclear-armed North Korea, in the 1970s, this coun-
try signed various agreements with the IAEA, and in
1985 North Korea signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). However, North Korea began construction
work on a gas-graphite reactor and this reactor was the
centre of North Korea’s nuclear problem because the
reactor extracted plutonium which is the key material
for nuclear weapons. ‘While North Korea insisted that
the reactor was for energy, there was no sign of any
steps to channel electricity from the reactor facilities
to the rest of the country. In addition, by 1991 both
the Soviet KGB and the American CIA had concluded
that a nuclear weapons program was indeed at an
advanced stage’ (McCormack, 2004: 151-152).
The dilemma for the international regimes is the
difficulty in compelling a state to obey the agreement.
North Korea’s disobedience shows that the national
interests of a state determine its action more than
pressure from outside. Although North Korea had
signed the international agreement and was pressured
by the international community particularly the
United States, the Kim government ignored it and
continued the nuclear proliferation program. Further-
more, to obtain nuclear weapons, rather than to obey
the agreement, North Korea instead announced that
they would not accept the additional inspections
proposed by the IEAE to resolve concerns about
possible violations. Instead, ‘one year after the United
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nations Security Council declared at the head of state
level that proliferation was a threat to international
peace and security, Pyongyang announced that it was
withdrawing from the NPT’ (F. Lehman II, 1993: 1-4).
This indicates the difficulty for international regimes
in attempting to compel a state when the interna-
tional treaty has to come head to head with the power
of state interest.
Therefore, using the IAEA and U.N. as instruments
to pressure North Korea is ‘time wasting’ policy.
Rather than obey the international regime’s proposal,
the North Korea government instead claims that the
international regimes are political tool of the United
States (Hassig and Kongdan Oh, 2005: 6).
STRONGER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: PREFERRED SOLU-
TION?
The United States and international community
attempt to look for solutions to deal with the North
Korea nuclear issue. Several policies are possible to
stop the proliferation, but each policy has to consider
the challenges and the consequences whether at
domestic, regional or international level. In this
regard, the international community can deliver
economic sanctions as an instrument to pressure
North Korea to discontinue nuclear proliferation. The
sanctions can be economic embargo, export control or
freezing of state assets. The sanctions are expected to
weaken the state economy in order to change its
nuclear proliferation policy. Economic instability
automatically pushes the state to be more compliant
and easier to bring into the negotiation process, to
discuss the issue and to look for a better solution,
because the economic embargo and freezing of assets
will exacerbate economic conditions and make it more
likely that the state will follow the international
proposal.
Obviously, the international community has
delivered the sanctions to North Korea through the
United Nations, but so far, the sanctions are not
working effectively to denuclearize North Korea. In
spite of the fact that, the US and UN sanctions have
banned shipments of luxury goods to North Korea,
and trade with South Korea, Japan, and the United
States has virtually stopped (Nanto and Manyin, 2010:
2), China’s leverage in North Korea is remains strong
and important regarding supply of food, fuel, indus-
trial machinery and even political support to the
regime, in order to keep stability on the Korean
peninsula. Furthermore, in 2009, China planned to
create a major new development zone called the
Tonghua - Dandong Economic Zone along the North
Korean border, aimed at boosting trade (Nanto and
Manyin, 2010: 12). This shows that China plays a
fundamental role in this issue, and the international
community recognizes that the consistent engagement
of China in the implementing of the sanctions is very
important.
Regarding this option, the international commu-
nity can tightly control export activity related to the
stuff of nuclear technology. Export activity is not only
conducted by the state but also by a proliferating
network in the private sector. ‘North Korea and Libya
reportedly used private firms to purchase centrifuge
components through Dubai, with assistance from the
Turkish electrical components firm Elektronik
Kontrol Aletleri (EKA), Sri Lankan businessman
Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, and the A.Q. Khan network’
(Braun and F. Chyba, 2004: 15).
Basically, controlling export of nuclear related
components is important because the ability to create
nuclear weapons is highly dependent on technological
raw materials to transform the uranium to weapons
grade. Mostly, the either as latent proliferation, first-
tier nuclear proliferation or second-tier proliferation
(Braun and F. Chyba, 2004: 5), states cannot produce
all the raw materials for nuclear weapons and in some
parts, are highly dependent on supply from other
parties, either other nuclear states or private compa-
nies. Hence, this measure is critical and has high
potential to discontinue nuclear proliferation in
North Korea or at least, decelerate the spread of
nuclear weapons around the world.
However, economic sanctions will cause economic
collapse in North Korea. This condition will lead to
starvation and a flood of refugees from North Korea
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to other neighbouring countries such as China and
South Korea. These matters are an obstacle to imple-
menting economic sanctions effectively. For instance,
China is continuing economic assistance to North
Korea by providing food and energy assistance. This
policy can be seen as an insurance that ‘Beijing remits
regularly to avoid paying the higher economic, politi-
cal, and national security costs of a North Korean
Collapse, a war on the peninsula, or the subsuming of
the North into the South’ (Braun and F. Chyba,
2004: 7). While implementing sanctions to prevent
the development of nuclear weapons, humanitarian
aid should also be provided by the international
community to North Korean people. This aid is to
avoid increasing starvation and the massive migration
of refugees to other neighbouring countries. Thus, it is
very important for the international community to
create an intensive dialog with China in order to look
for the best form of economic sanctions for North
Korea by considering the social impacts, starvation
and flood of refugees, of this sanctions.
CONCLUSION
All in all, nuclear proliferation in North Korea is
an obvious threat for regional and international
security. It poses threats because North Korea has the
potential to export nuclear weapons technology to
other states, and of course the spread of nuclear
weapons around the world will increase the possibility
of non-state actors such as terrorist groups gaining
possession of missiles and nuclear weapons. Moreover,
the existence of nuclear weapons can cause an arms
race in that region, and also the authoritarian Kim
regime is highly likely to use nuclear weapons in a war.
This problem needs an effective solutions with
consideration of the challenges and the consequences,
such as the possibility of starvation in North Korea,
the flood of refugees, the instability of the Korean
peninsula and also the spread of nuclear radioactivity
to other countries in that region. To deal with the
problem, war is not preferred for many parties in the
region, nor for China or the U.S. closest allies, Japan
and South Korea. This option is cannot work effec-
tively without major support from those countries.
In addition, regarding the impact, attacking North
Korea is very risky and makes many parties highly
vulnerable whether North Korean citizens, states in
the region or even the U.S and its allies. While
attacking North Korea will have great impact, military
intervention to change the regime and to freeze
nuclear proliferation is likely to be extremely difficult.
Besides that, pressure on North Korea through
international institutions is also ineffective, because
the North Korean government can reject the
institution’s proposal or inspections of the nuclear
site.
Presently, the international community can
strengthen economic sanctions by engaging China
more deeply in implementing the policy. This measure
is more do-able and appropriate, at the moment, for
international community, in order to denuclearize the
Korean peninsula or at least, to slow down the nuclear
proliferation with minimum impact.
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